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Wells Fargo & Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner:
Rethinking the Deductibility of Certain Pre-Merger
Expenditures*
I. INTRODUCTION

According to the Mergers and Acquisitions Journal, mergers and acquisitions activity has been smashing records over the past few years. 1 In
fact, in 1998, for the first time in American history, over 10,000 transactions were completed? A record breaking $1.394 trillion in transactions
was completed in 1999. 3 This trend has continued. In the first two quarters of 2000 alone there were nearly $1 trillion in deals. 4 Mega-mergers
such as Chevron/Texaco, Time Wamer/AOL, and J.P. Morgan/Chase
Manhattan are announced on what seems to be a regular basis. Indeed,
there has been continual growth in the mergers and acquisitions arena.
In each transaction, significant pre-merger costs are incurred. 5 Such
costs may include due diligence costs, legal fees, accounting fees, and
investment banking fees. These expenditures account for millions, if not
billions, of dollars in expenses on an annual basis. As such, the tax characterization of these expenditures, i.e., whether they are capital expenses
or ordinary business expenses, has significant ramifications on the tax
liability of the taxpayer and, consequently, on the revenue collected by
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").

*

Copyright© 2001 by Jeffery R. Atkin.

I. See Martin Sikora, M&A A/mnnac-1999 M&A Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J.,

Feb. I, 2000.
2. See id. The statistics were supplied by the Mergers & Corporate Transactions Database of
Thomson Financial Securities Data Co.
The ... information [was] based on all completed mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures
priced at $5 million and over, as well as purchases of partial interest that involved at least
a 40% stake in the target company or an investment of at least $100 million. Except
where noted, the data only cover transactions in which American companies were on both
sides of the deal or were on at least one side as buyer or seller.
Jd.

3. See id.
4. See M&A Scoreboard 2nd Q 2000, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS J., Sept I, 2000.
5. Although different in nature and form, for purposes of this Note, the terms "merger" and
"acquisition" are used interchangeably. Additionally, the Note uses terms such as "deal" and "transaction" to signify the event that has occurred or will occur to which the expenditures at issue are
related.
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The question of what expenditures may be deducted and what must
6
be capitalized has long been controversial. This basic tax question has
been around since the enactment of the income tax. More recently, it was
the question at issue in Wells Fargo & Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner ("Wells Fargo"). 7
In Wells Fargo, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part
the Tax Court's holding that pre-closing investigatory/legal fees and officers' salaries attributable to the merger must be capitalized. In doing so,
the court explained that the Tax Court had misinterpreted the Supreme
8
Court's opinion in INDOPCO Inc. v. Commissioner.
This Note seeks to explain the basic law with respect to the tax consequences of the pre-merger expenditures at issue. In particular, the Note
seeks to explain why the Eighth Circuit was correct in its interpretation
and application of INDOPCO as it relates to the specific expenditures at
issue in Wells Fargo-namely, investigatory/legal fees and officers'
salaries attributable to the merger. Part II outlines the relevant sections of
the Internal Revenue Code and briefly summarizes the historical case
law. Part III explains the history of the Wells Fargo case, including the
facts, the Tax Court's opinion, and the Eighth Circuit's opinion. Part IV
analyzes the deductibility of the legal fees and officers' salaries at issue
in the case. Part V summarizes the Note and concludes that the Eighth
Circuit properly allowed the expenses to be currently deductible.

II.

RELEVANT CODE SECTIONS AND CASE LAW

A. Applicable Code Sections
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) allows for a
deduction for all "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur9
ing the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business .... " This includes "salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered."10
Section 263 prohibits deductions for amounts "paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to in-

6. See Ellen Macneil, et. al., Tax Accounting Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions, in 2 TAX
STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES,
FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 923, 954 (PLI Tax Law & Estate Planning
Course Handbook Series No. J-404, 1997) [hereinafter Macneil].
7. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).
8. See generally !NDOPCO Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
9. I.R.C. § 162(a) ( 1994). All Code sections refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, and the regulations thereunder, unless otherwise noted.
10. I.R.C. § 162(a)(l) (1994).
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crease the value of any property or estate." 11 These items must be capitalized.12 Treasury Regulation 1.263(a)-2(a) provides that capital expenditures include "[t ]he cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar
13
property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year."
B. Historical Case Law
Prior to INDOPCO, the case law concerning outlays in relation to the
14
expansion of a business was somewhat in disarray. Nonetheless, the
courts generally had ruled that costs incurred in expanding an existing
business were deductible. 15 In determining what constituted the expansion of an existing trade or business, the courts generally focused on
whether the taxpayer obtained a "separate and distinct additional asset." 16
Many courts concluded that if a business expenditure could not be reasonably allocated to a specific asset, then it should not be capitalized but
immediately deducted as an expense. 17
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner18 was the principal case
permitting businesses to deduct expansion costs. In Briarcliff Candy, a
candy manufacturer that had historically sold its products to stores downtown sought to expand by selling to suburban retailers. Consequently,
Briarcliff Candy incurred significant promotional costs and costs in negotiating franchise contracts with the suburban retailers. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that these expenditures did not create any
separate and distinct asset and thus were currently deductible. 19 The court
II. I.R.C.§263(1994).
12. Treas. Regs. § 1.263(a)-2 (1994). This regulation lists examples of capital expenditures
and explains that section 263 disallows deductions for the cost of acquiring property "having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." !d. at § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994). Thus, any item falling
within the interpretation of section 263 is characterized as a capital expenditure and must be capitalized rather than deducted as a current expense. This does not mean that the expenditure will never be
recovered. Expenditures for most assets are amortized over the useful life of the asset. Nonetheless,
some assets, like merger-related costs, start-up costs and land are assumed to have a perpetual or
indefinite useful life, thus the expenditure is not recovered until the property is sold or the business is
terminated.
13. Treas. Regs.§ 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994).
14. See NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding that expenses
incurred by expanding bank were deductible because no new asset was created); Briarcliff Candy
Corp. v. Comm'r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding that expenses were currently deductible because there was no separate and distinct asset); but see Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); Bilar Tool & Dye v. Comm'r, 530 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1976).
15. See Javaras & Maynes, 534 T.M. Start-up Expenditures (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolios
1997) [hereinafter Javaras & Maynes].
16. !d.§ IV at A-19.
17. See supra note 14.
18. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
19. See Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 782.
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derived the "separate and distinct additional asset" test from the Supreme
20
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass 'n.
In INDOPCO, the Supreme Court held that expenditures incurred in
21
evaluating a friendly takeover had to be capitalized. In so doing, it
seemed to reject key precedents like Briarcliff Candy. The Supreme
Court found the expenditures had to be capitalized because of the factual
finding that the acquisition produced a long-term benefit. The Court did
22
not rely on the "separate and distinct asset" test.

III. THE HISTORY OF WELLS FARGO
A. General Facts ofWells Fargo
24

25

Norwest, 23 Bettendorf Bank, and Davenport were the parties to
the original transaction. In short, the transaction consisted of the consolidation of Davenport and Bettendorf to form New Davenport with New
Davenport being a subsidiary of Norwest.
In 1989, due to new interstate banking legislation adopted in Iowa,
Davenport's management believed that larger outside banks would enter
7
the Quad Cities area, 26 and Davenport would be unable to compete?
Shortly thereafter, Norwest discussed with Davenport the possibility of
joining the businesses. These merger discussions intensified in early
1991, at which time Davenport retained the law firm of Lane & Waterman ("L & W") to represent and assist them. L & W researched whether
Davenport would strategically fit with Norwest and whether the reor28
ganization would benefit the community.

20. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
21. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79.
22. ld.
23. NoiWest, incorporated in 1929, is a bank holding company that is the parent corporation
of an affiliated group of corporations including 79 commercial banks in 12 states and other financial
services corporations. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 876. The facts outlined in this section are those
facts adopted in Wells Fargo.
24. Bettendorf Bank, National Association ("Bettendorf'), is a member of the NoiWest consolidated group. See id. at 876.
25. Davenport, incorporated in 1932, is an Iowa State Bank with a main office in Davenport
and four branches, three in Davenport, and one in Donahue, Iowa. Davenport originally provided
banking services in the four-city area that consists of Davenport, Bettendorf, Rock Island, IL, and
Moline, IL ("Quad Cities Area"). See id. at 876-77.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 877. Davenport's management was particularly concerned with its size. Davenport was larger than the small community banks but smaller than the large regional banks. /d.
28. See id.
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On June 10, 1991, Davenport's board met to consider the merger of
Davenport into Norwest. 29 The board authorized executive officers to
negotiate with Norwest and appointed a special committee to perform an
independent due diligence review, obtain professional advice, and report
as to the fairness of the proposed transaction. 30
On July 22, 1991, Davenport's board met to discuss the transaction
consisting of the consolidation of Davenport and Bettendorf to form New
Davenport, which would be a wholly owned subsidiary of Norwest. 31 After the special committee recommended that the transaction be approved
and J.P. Morgan opined that it was fair, Davenport's board approved the
transaction. Similarly, Bettendorf's board approved the transaction.
On the same day, the parties agreed to the transaction subject to certain approvals. 32 Immediately after the agreement, Norwest, with the assistance of Davenport employees and L & W, began performing a due
diligence review on Davenport. L & W acted as the primary contact between Norwest and Davenport. 33
At a special shareholder's meeting, on November 26, 1991, Davenport's shareholders approved the transaction. 34 A few weeks later, Bettendorf's shareholders approved the transaction. 35 The consolidation of
Davenport and Bettendorf became effective on January 19, 1992, and at
12:01 a.m. the transaction became effective. 36 The board and management of Davenport believed that the transaction would provide significant long-term benefits for Davenport and its shareholders. 37
For 1991, Davenport alleged that $111,270 of the legal expenses
should be deductible. Of the $111,270, $83,450 was paid for services
rendered in investigating the products, services, and reputation of Norwest and determining whether the Norwest and Bettendorf consolidation
would fit well into the business community. 38 The $83,450 was for services rendered prior to July 21, 1991, and none of it was for services relating to negotiating price, working on the fairness opinion, advising

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. New Davenport would be a national bank that would be wholly owned by Norwest. See

id.
32. See id. In particular, the parties agreed to the transaction subject to regulatory approvals,
approval of Davenport's and Bettendorfs shareholders, and a positive tax opinion.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 878.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 878-79.
37. See id. at 878. The merger would enable the bank to offer a wider array of products and
services. See id.
38. See id.
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Davenport's board with respect to its fiduciary duties, or satisfying securities law requirements. 39
Additionally, Davenport deducted $150,000 on its federal income tax
return for 1999 for the officers' salaries attributable to the services performed in the transaction. 40 None of the officers were specifically hired
to facilitate the merger. The officers carried on the normal day-to-day activities of Davenport, and the merger did not affect the officers' salaries.41
B. The Tax Court's Decision in Norwest
Wells Fargo began in the Tax Court as Norwest Corp. and
Subsidiaries v. Commissioner. 42 In Norwest, the Tax Court followed its
previous position and held that Davenport, the target company, was not
entitled to deduct pre-transaction investigatory and due diligence costs
incurred by the target company. 43 In addition, the Tax Court held that the
salaries of Davenport's officers were not deductible to the extent that the
salaries were attributable to the officers' work on the transaction. 44
In rejecting Norwest's arguments that the fees and costs should be
immediately deducted because they were ordinary and necessary expenses and that INDOPCO was not controlling because it did not overrule the line of cases allowing such costs to be deducted, 45 the Tax Court
explained that it interpreted INDOPCO to have displaced the body of law
in Briarcliff Candy and its progeny. The court opined that, although a
separate and distinct asset may not have been created, an expense is still
not "ordinary" if it "generates a significant long-term benefit that extends
beyond the end of the taxable year." 46

39. See id.
40. See id. at 880.
41. See id.
42. 112 T.C. 89 (1999). This was the Tax Court case for the Wells Fargo case discussed in
this Note. NoJWest was litigating as a successor in interest to Davenport Bank. By the time of the
appeal, Wells Fargo had merged with NoJWest, thus accounting for the various changes in the party
names.
43. See id. at 90; see also Mark J. Silverman & Andrew J. Weinstein, Tax Treatment of Reorganization Costs, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS,
JOINT VENTURES, FINANCING, REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS, 1131, 1147 (PLI Tax Law
and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. J0-002R, 2000) [hereinafter Silverman &
Weinstein"]; Gary L. Maydew, To Deduct or Capitalize: Courts and IRS Interpret INDOPCO, 63
PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 145, 147 (Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Maydew].
44. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 90.
45. See Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 775; NCNB, 684 F.2d at 285. These cases allowed for
the deduction of investigatory and due diligence costs incurred incident to the business expansion.
46. Norwest, 112 T.C. at 97 (citing INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79).
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The Tax Court went on to explain that in two prior cases it had required the capitalization of acquisition-related expenditures. 47 The court
held that in both cases, as in INDOPCO, the expenses (investigatory
costs, due diligence costs, and professional services fees) had to be capitalized because the expenditures were incurred incident to a friendly
takeover from which significant long-term benefits would be derived. 48
Norwest argued that its case was distinguishable from those cases because its costs were not a direct cost of the corporate acquisition but were
incurred before and incidental to the acquisition. The Tax Court was unpersuaded by Norwest's argument and responded that they were "preparatory expenses" and that, according to INDOPCO, "the costs must be
capitalized because they are connected to an event (namely, the merger)
that produced a significant long-term benefit." 49
The Tax Court did not explain why the officers' salaries were to be
capitalized. It merely stated in its general findings that "all costs were
sufficiently related to an event that produced a significant long-term
benefit." 50 The court disallowed the deductions for these salaries.
C. Wells Fargo & Company and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner

1. General background ofWells Fargo
After the transaction at issue, Norwest was acquired by Wells Fargo.
51
The case went directly to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
52
from the Tax Court. The Court of Appeals, reversing in part the Tax
Court, concluded that the Tax Court had misread JNDOPCO and that the
$150,000 of officers' salaries in dispute and $83,450 of legal fees, which
were incurred prior to Davenport's final decision, were fully deductible.53

47. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 99-100 (discussing Victory Mkts., Inc. & Subs. v. Commiss'r,
99 T.C. 648 (1992) and A.E. Staley Mtg. Co. & Subs. v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 166 (1995), rev'd and
rerrwnded, 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997)).
48. See id. There has been some distinction between friendly takeovers and hostile takeovers.
Although it is not the topic of this Note, it is important to understand the current distinctions. Many
have argued and some courts have agreed that in a hostile takeover, it is "necessary" and "ordinary"
to defend in order to maintain the ongoing company, so expenses related to successfully defeating a
hostile takeover should be immediately deducted. Nonetheless, it is clear that fees incurred in an
unsuccessful merger, even if friendly, are currently deductible. See Silverman & Weinstein, supra
note 43, at 1131.
49. Norwest, 112. T.C. at I 00.
50. !d. at 102.
51. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is referred to in the Note as the "Eighth Circuit" or
the "Court of Appeals."
52. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 876.
53. See id. at 889.
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2. The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the case

The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining the basic
foundation and distinction between capitalization and deductibility of
expenses. 54 1t then outlined the Supreme Court's precedent and explained
how and why the Tax Court had erred.
a. The Supreme Court's precedent. The Court of Appeals explained
how and why the Tax Court erred in its interpretation and application of
INDOPCO by likening the alleged error in logical reasoning made by the
Tax Court to similar logical fallacies among the circuit courts of appeal
in interpreting Lincoln Savings, 55 and the Supreme Court's attempt to
clarify Lincoln Savings in its holding in INDOPCO.
The issue in Lincoln Savings was whether the Savings and Loan association could deduct an "additional prernium." 56 In finding that the additional premium must be capitalized, the Supreme Court stated that the
presence of a "future benefit" is not controlling and that it was important
and controlling that "a separate and distinct asset" had been created. 57
The Eighth Circuit explained that at least five circuit courts of appeal erroneously interpreted this language to mean that the Supreme Court had
adopted a new "separate and distinct additional asset" test that allowed
necessary business expenditures to be fully deductible unless the expenditure "created or enhanced a separate and distinct additional asset." 58
The Eighth Circuit illustrated the fallacy through the use of basic
logical symbols, equations, and diagrams in relation to Lincoln Savings. 59
54. It began by explaining that under the I.R.C., section 162 allows deductions for "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses." However, section 263 does not allow deductions for capital expenditures-"an amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate." The Court then explained that the dispute is
centered around "whether the expenses in this case can properly be characterized as 'ordinary."' See
id. If the expense is "ordinary," then it may be fully deducted. On the other hand, if it is not ordinary,
it is a capital expense and must be depreciated over the life of the underlying asset, or where no specific asset or useful life exists, the expense is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise. See id.
(citing INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83-84).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 881; see also Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 403 U.S. 345, 345
( 1971 ). In Lincoln Savinxs, the Savings and Loan companies were initially required to pay only one
premium to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, but beginning 1962, the companies were required to pay an "additional premium" that funded the Secondary Reserve. Lincoln Savings had a property interest in the Secondary Reserve. /d. at 354.
57. Lincoln Savinxs, 403 U.S. at 354.
58. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 881. See, e.g., Briarcliff" Candy, 475 F.2d at 775; NCNB, 684
F.2d at 285; Central Tex. Sav. & Loan, 731 F.2d at 1181; Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank v. United
States, 505 F.2d 1185 (I Oth Cir. 1974); First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Comm'r, 592 F.2d I 050 (9th Cir.
1979).
59. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 881. The court used the following symbols for its equations:
A =physical capital ASSET created or enhanced;
NOT A = NO physical capital ASSET created or enhanced;
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In Lincoln Savings, the Supreme Court held that if an expenditure creates
or enhances a separate and distinct asset, then it must be capitalized. 60 In
61
terms of the logical equation, this holding would read as "if A then C."
The Eighth Circuit explained that the logical error occurred when the circuit courts read "if A then C" as if it read "only if A then C."62 In addition, Lincoln Savings held that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that
may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year." 63 The
Eighth Circuit explained that this was misinterpreted to mean that the future benefit was irrelevant when determining if an expenditure must be
capitalized-a holding in error with what Lincoln Savings actually
held. 64
b. The court's analysis ofiNDOPCO. After years of confusion among
the circuit courts, as illustrated above, the Supreme Court issued
65
INDOPC0 to clarify the holding in Lincoln Savings. Writing for the
Court in INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun clarified:
Lincoln Savings stands for the simple proposition that a taxpayer's expenditure that serves to create or enhance ... a separate and distinct asB= BENEFIT beyond the taxable year;
NOT B = NO benefit beyond the taxable year;
R= the expense is directly Related to B;
NOT R= the expense is only indirectly Related to B;
C= CAPITALIZE;
NOT C= do NOT Capitalize (this can be equal to a deduction).
!d. See also WADDELL, WARD JR., STRUCTURE OF LAWS: As REPRESENTED BY SYMBOLIC METHODS I (1961).
60. See Lincoln SavinRs, 403 U.S. at 354.
61. Wells FarRo, 224 F. 3d at 882. See note 59 and accompanying text for explanations of the
symbols.
62. See id. The court further explained variations of the mistake in logic:
Clearly, the two statements are different and yield different results. Another way to misstate the holding of Lincoln SavinKS is to say "if NOT A then NOT C, but this too is not
interchangeable with the actual holding, "if A then C." An equally poor reading of the
term "if A then C," would be "if C then A" Unless two terms are proven to be reflexive
of one another, they can not be haphazardly interchanged. And yet these are the very mistakes in logic that some Circuits were laboring under while misinterpreting Lincoln SavinRs. By establishing a "new test" which would not require capitalization unless a new
asset was created, those courts were reading Lincoln Savings to hold one of the following: I) "if C then A", 2) "only if A then Cor 3) "if NOT A then NOT C," none of which
is equivalent to the true holding, "if A then C."
!d.
63. Lincoln SavinKS, 403 U.S. at 354.
64. Wells FarRo, 224 F.3d 882. In the logic terms outlined, the court re-wrote the statement
in Lincoln Saving~ to read: "B not= C." (B does not equal C). The court then explained: "This simply is not true. When determining whether a necessary business expenditure must be capitalized or
deducted, it is of critical importance to determine whether the expenditure resulted in a long term
benefit." !d. (citing JNDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87-88).
65. JNDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79.
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set should be capitalized under § 263. It by no means follows, however,
that only expenditures that create or enhance separated and distinct assets are to be capitalized under§ 263.
In short, Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a separate and distinct asset well may be a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition to
classification as a capital expenditure. 66

According to the Eighth Circuit, INDOPCO clarifies that if an expenditure creates a separate and distinct asset then it must be capitalized
and no further analysis need be done (if A then C); but if the expenditure
does not create a new capital asset, further inquiry must be performed. 67
The Eighth Circuit went on to explain that according to INDOPCO,
even when a particular expenditure does not create a new asset (NOT A),
there are situations where the expense must still be capitalized (C). However, there are also occasions when such expenditures may be deducted.
Hence, the court concluded, "if NOT A then (C or D)."68 It then explained that determining whether to capitalize (C) or deduct (D) depends
in part on the long-term benefit of the asset. "If there is not a long term
benefit (B) associated with the expenditure, then the appropriate tax
treatment is current deduction." 69 On the other hand, the court stated that
there is not an easy answer if the expenditure does not create a new asset,
but does provide a long-term benefit. 70
c. The Tax Court's illogical reading of INDOPCO. The Court of Appeals explained that the Tax Court's first mistake was its failure to separate the officers' salaries from the investigatory/legal expenses and perform independent analyses to determine their deductibility. Second, the
Eighth Circuit, through the use of logical equations, illustrated how the
Tax Court erroneously interpreted INDOPCO to require capitalization of
the expenses simply because the expenditures were incidentally connected with a future benefit. 71 In particular, the Tax Court held: "In accordance with INDOPCO [sic], [all] the costs must be capitalized because they are connected to an event (namely, the transaction) that

66. See id. at 86-87. As the Eighth Circuit explained, "INDOPCO clearly and unequivocally
demonstrates that statements such as "only if A then C," and "if NOT A then NOT C" are false
statements." Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 883.
67. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 883.
68. /d. at 884.
69. /d. The court further explained that this is because the Code seeks to match expenses with
the revenues of the taxable period to which they are associated.
70. See id. The court supports this by quoting INDOPCO where Justice Blackmun explained:
"The Court has recognized, however, that the 'decisive distinctions' between current expenses and
capital expenditures 'are those of degree and not of kind,' and that because each case 'turns on its
special facts,' the cases sometimes appear difficult to harmonize." /d. (internal citations omitted).
71. See id. at 886.
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cluded:

72

231

The Eighth Circuit con-

This is a misinterpretation of INDOPCO. The Tax Court is saying that
C must result because of the presence of B. This is equivalent to "if B
then C," which we have previously proven to be a false statement.
Herein lies the mistake of the Tax Court. Just as the Court in Lincoln
Savings did not create a new test for determining whether current deduction or capitalization is the proper tax consequence of an expenditure, it also did not create a new test in the INDOPCO case. Therefore,
it is not proper to decide that a cost must be capitalized solely because
the fact finder determines that the cost is "incidentally connected" with
73
a long term benefit.

d.
The court found Davenport's officers' salaries were a fully
deductible expense. The court rejected the Tax Court's holding that the

officers' salaries must be capitalized. Instead, it found that the salaries
were directly related to the employment relationship but only indirectly
related to the acquisition, and, therefore, the salary expenses were deductible.74 The Eighth Circuit, applying the "origin of the claim doctrine"
and somewhat persuaded by many private letter rulings of the IRS,
agreed that the expenses in INDOPCO were directly related to the transaction that produced the long-term benefit and so needed to be capitalized. 75 However, the court distinguished those expenses from the officers' salaries by explaining that the salary expenditures at issue were
only indirectly related to the long-term benefit (the acquisition); conse76
quently, the salaries could be deducted.
e. A portion of Davenport's legal/investigatory expenses were deductible. The court allowed $83,450 of the $111,270 of legal fees in dispute to be deducted. The Commissioner apparently changed his position
with respect to the expenditures that it determined were attributable to
the "investigatory stage" of the transaction and agreed with the taxpayer

72. /d. at 885 (quoting Norwest, 112 T.C. at 100).
73. /d. (internal footnotes omitted). The court went on to explain that this is supported by
both Lincoln Savings and /NDOPCO. See Lincoln Savings & Loan., 403 U.S. at 354 (stating that
"many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year");
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87 (noting that "the mere presence of an incidental future benefit-'some
future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization").
74. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 888.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 887-88. See Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970); Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940); TAM 95-40-003
(June 30, 1995); PLR 93-26-001 (Mar. 18, 1993); TAM 95-27-005 (Mar. 15, 1995); TAM 97-21002 (Jan. 24, 1997); TAM 97-31-001 (Jan. 31, 1997).
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that such expenses should be deducted, not capitalized. The Commis77
sioner attributed $83,450 of the expenses to the "investigatory stage."
IV. ANALYSIS

The question of whether to capitalize or deduct acquisition-related
expenses has long been a controversial one. Some courts have made distinctions between friendly takeovers and other takeovers, such as hostile
or abandoned takeovers. 78 Although this area of tax law may be unclear,
it is clear that the courts have raised the bar, making it more difficult for
a taxpayer to deduct a pre-acquisition expenses. 79 In INDOPCO, the Supreme Court asserted that capitalization is the norm and deductions are
the exception, and that creation of a separate and distinct asset never was
necessary to require capitalization. 80 While the IRS has been somewhat
moderate in its position with respect to pre-merger expenses, the Tax
Court has been aggressive in interpreting INDOPCO as unfavorable to
taxpayers. 81 Wells Fargo is an example of the Tax Court taking an aggressive position in applying its interpretation of INDOPC0. 82 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the Tax Court was too aggressive in its
interpretation and held that certain pre-transaction investigatory costs
were currently deductible. 83
After the Supreme Court's decision in INDOPCO, many authors
have commented that it has become very difficult for companies to deduct acquisition-related expenditures. 84 Indeed, one author even suggested that "[a]fter the [INDOPCO] decision, there seems to be very little
to discuss regarding the deductibility of takeover costs incurred where a

77. !d.
78. See Silverman & Weinstein, supra note 43, at I I 39. This Note focuses on the limited
scope of the holding in Wells Fargo. For other types of transactions, see MARTIN D. GINSBURG &
JACKS. LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND BUYOUTS (2000) (hereinafter GINSBURG & LEVIN].
79. See Maydew, supra note 43.
80. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
8 I. See Maydew, supra note 43, at I 52.
82. See id.
83. See Wells Fargo, 224 F. 3d at 874.
84. See Maydew, supra note 43, at 146. Gary Maydew of Iowa State University explained:
The Court obviously did not want the tax definition of a capital asset narrowed to the extent that taxpayers could expense all expenditures that did not create separate and identifiable assets.
The application of INDOPCO by the lower courts has made it very difficult for companies to deduct acquisition costs incurred in a friendly takeover. The Tax Court, in particular, has relied on INDOPCO to eliminate the deductibility of these acquisition costs.
!d. See also Macneil, supra note 6, at 975.
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85

board willingly approves a takeover." The IRS and the Tax Court have
86
been very aggressive in not allowing deductions.
In one of its more recent attempts to require capitalization, the Tax
Court held in Norwest that the portion of regular and ordinary salaries of
a bank's officers (salaries that were payable regardless of the merger and
not affected by the merger) attributable to the time spent analyzing a potential merger were not currently deductible as an operating expense, but
87
had to be capitalized. The Tax Court's holding in Norwest has been
criticized by some authors as "wrong." 88 Moreover, others have suggested that the INDOPCO decision is being "asserted out of context by
overly aggressive revenue agents." 89 The Eighth Circuit agreed and in
Wells Fargo reversed the Tax Court finding that the officers' salaries and
90
part of the investigatory/legal fees were currently deductible.
This portion of the Note explores the tax consequences of the
merger-related expenses incurred in the Wells Fargo case, namely, premerger investigatory and legal fees and officers' salaries attributable to
the merger. This Note does not seek to establish a new test, or recommend a new test that would miraculously and easily resolve all controversy.91 The Note will, however, seek to analyze and explain that the
court of appeals in Wells Fargo correctly concluded that the expenditures
at issue were deductible because: (1) case law supports the holding; (2) it
is consistent with the legislative history of section 195 of the I.R.C.; (3)
the IRS's own positions support it; and (4) public policy requires it.
As the Eighth Circuit explained, the two expenditures at issue are inherently different and, because of the positions taken by the parties, will
be analyzed separately. 92
85. Macneil, supra note 6, at 975.
86. See Silverman & Weinstein, supra note 43.
87. See Norwest, 112 T.C. 89, No.9; see also Curtis Elliott & Christopher E. Hannum, The
Chaos of!NDOPCO and Value Creation: Long-term Business Expansion or Recovery?, 90 J. TAX'N
338 (June 1999) [hereinafter Elliott & Hannum].
88. See GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 4-16 ("We believe Norwest was wrongly decided to the extent that it concluded none of the investigatory expenses were deductible business
expansion costs.").
89. Elliott & Hannum, supra note 87, at 339.
90. See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 889.
91. One author, after explaining that most of the time either parties just "admit" to future
benefit or the courts simply "equate" benefit without really evaluating the value:
The controversy created by INDOPCO will not be put to rest until legislation clarifies
this issue or the Supreme Court undertakes a renewed examination of the area. Until either of these events occur, taxpayers will continue to find what otherwise would be considered traditional ongoing expenses to be in jeopardy unless they support deductibility
through sufficient preparation and logical strategies.
Elliott & Hannum, supra note 87, at 357.
92. As the court in Wells Fargo explained, the Tax Court erred "when it failed to perform an
independent analysis to determine the fate of Davenport's officers' salaries, and another for the in-
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A. Investigatory Expenditures Incurred Before the "Final Decision" Are
Deductible
The controversy over what pre-merger legal and investigatory costs
in a friendly merger may be deducted has largely been resolved and
therefore will not be discussed in detail in this Note. Originally, the
Commissioner had argued that all such expenditures must be capitalized.
However, after Norwest, the Commissioner changed his position regard93
ing investigatory/legal expenditures. On appeal, the Commissioner
conceded that he had been wrong and that the Tax Court had erred in re94
quiring capitalization of all the costs. In fact, the Commissioner agreed
that legal expenses "attributable to the investigatory stage of the transaction" may be deducted. 95 Thus, the only material issue remaining was the
96
question of how to define what constituted "investigatory costs." According to I.R.C. section I 95's legislative history, investigatory expenses
are those incurred prior to the "final decision to acquire or to enter" a
particular business. 97 The IRS determined that deductible investigatory
costs are those "which are related to the questions 'whether to acquire a
98
business' and 'which business to acquire."' Once the "final decision" is
made to acquire a particular business, further investigatory costs "be-

vestigatory costs associated with the acquisition." Wells Fargo, 224 F. 3d at 885.
93. See id. at 888.
94. See id. Because the IRS is the body enforcing the tax laws, as a practical matter, the position taken by the Commissioner can generally be relied upon as the governing law.
95. /d. (internal quotations omitted).
96. !d.
97. S. REP. No. 96-1036, at II (1980).
98. Wells Fargo, 224 F. 3d at 889. Levin explained:
The meaning of "final decision" is not entirely clear. One rational approach would be that
P has made a final decision to acquire T only when it has signed a binding agreement to
acquire T and no longer has a discretionary right to withdraw from the transaction, e.g., a
general due diligence out (as opposed to a right to withdraw only forT's breach of a specific representation or warranty, e.g., a material adverse change out). Under this approach, if P signed a binding contract to acquire T, which gave P a general due diligence
out, a final decision would be made at the earlier of expiration of the due diligence out or
closing of the acquisition.
At the other end of the spectrum, P could be viewed as having made a final decision to
acquire T when it entered into a non-binding letter of intent to acquire T or perhaps even
earlier when P made an offer to acquire T.
In Rev. Rul. 99-23, IRS opted for the latter approach, stating:
The "final decision" referred to in the legislative history of section 195 is the point at
which a taxpayer makes its decision whether to acquire a business, and which business to
acquire, rather than the point at which a taxpayer and seller are legally obligated to complete the transaction ... Accordingly, expenditures incurred in the course of a general
search for, or an investigation of, an active trade or business, i.e., expenditures paid or incurred in order to determine whether to enter a new business and which new business to
enter ... , are investigatory costs that are start-up expenditures under section 195 ....
GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 4-12.
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come expenses attributable to facilitating consummation of the acquisition" and as such are not deductible. 99 The Eighth Circuit correctly concluded that there is no "bright line rule" for determining when the "final
decision" occurred, but that it must instead be determined on a case-bycase basis. 100
The frustrating result emerging from the holding in Wells Fargo is
that it does not give much guidance as to when the "final decision" occurs. Obviously, having a bright line rule would make it easier to determine when the "final decision" occurred. However, having a case-bycase rule has various benefits. Each transaction and negotiation is different and thus the "final decisions" are likely to occur at different stages of
the transaction depending on the parties. The case-by-case rule gives the
court the flexibility to more closely determine when the final decision
actually occurred. Along the same lines, establishing a bright line rule
could lead to wide spread taxpayer abuse. For example, if the "final decision" were to be established as occurring when the board formally approved the transaction or when the letter of intent was signed, then companies could incur substantial investigatory expenses and simply delay
performing the event that would trigger the "final decision." Consequently, companies could shift costs "attributable to facilitating consummation of the acquisition," which generally must be capitalized, into
pre-"final decision" costs that could be deductible. This would violate
the underlying principle that only costs related to the questions of
"whether to acquire a business" and "which business to acquire" are
properly deductible. 101 Moreover, under a bright line rule, companies
may be able to avoid the "final decision" altogether. For example, if the
signing of a letter of intent constituted the "final decision," companies
could simply not sign a letter of intent. Thus, the case-by-case approach
is appropriate.
B. The Court Correctly Concluded that the Officers' Salaries Were
Deductible
This Note concludes that case law, the legislative history of section
195, the IRS's own positions, and public policy support the Eighth Circuit's ruling that the officers' salaries were deductible.

99. Wells Far~:o, 224 F.3d at 889.
I 00. /d. ("Our detennination on this point is not to be construed as a 'bright line rule' for detennining when a 'final decision' has been made. The facts and circumstances of each case must be
evaluated independently to make a proper finding on that issue.").
101. Seeid.
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1. Case law supports deducting the officers' salaries
Traditionally, the courts have allowed officers' salaries, similar to
those in this case, to be currently deducted. 102 However, the Tax Court
clearly took the position that acquisition-related expenses in a friendly
transaction must be capitalized. The Tax Court committed three fatal
flaws in reaching this conclusion. First, in its apparent decision to expand
the scope of INDOPCO, the court failed to separately analyze the distinct
and unique expenditures at issue. Secondly, the court further erred by
confusing the argument that the salaries were only indirectly related to
the merger with being one of timing. Thirdly, it misinterpreted
103
INDOPCO as requiring all pre-acquisition expenses to be capitalized.
The two expenditures at issue-legal/investigatory fees and officers'
salaries-are very different in nature and thus needed to be analyzed
separately. Although some of the legal/investigatory fees may have been
incurred prior to the "final decision," the fees were clearly related to the
transaction. Had there never been merger talks, the fees would not have
arisen. On the other hand, the officers' salaries had always existed. The
merger in no way affected the salaries the officers received. Even if there
were no merger talks, the officers would have received the same compensation. By failing to separate the two expenditures, the Tax Court set
itself up for failure.
The salaries at issue here were only indirectly related to the merger
and thus are distinguishable from the other costs. The Tax Court clearly
recognized that INDOPCO dealt with costs that were "directly" related to
the corporate acquisition while the costs in the case at bar were only "in104
cidentally" or "indirectly" related to the corporate acquisition. Nonetheless, the Tax Court refused to distinguish between direct and indirect
costs and consequently did not allow the taxpayer to deduct the indirectly
related officers' salaries. In reaching this conclusion, the Tax Court
wrongly equated the fact that the salaries were only indirect costs with
that of timing. The Tax Court never analyzed or explained why officer
salaries were required to be capitalized when those salaries had always
been paid and would be paid regardless of the merger and had no association with the merger other than some unexplained allocation of time
that the officers spent on pre-merger issues. The Tax Court simply concluded that it believed that any pre-transaction costs that provided "longterm benefit" must be capitalized regardless of whether "management

102. See. e.g., id. at 874; Dixie Frosted Foods, Inc. v. Comm'r, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 586 (1947);
Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C. 275 (1967).
103. See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 100.
104. See id.
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[had] formally decided to enter into the transaction." 105 In addition, the
court arbitrarily concluded that the costs were "sufficiently related" to
106
the transaction that produced long-term benefit.
Moreover, the Tax
Court continued analyzing the issue of timing when timing had nothing
to do with the officers' salaries.
The Tax Court argued that the officers' salaries at bar are similar to
Acer Realty Co. v. Commissioner, in which the salaries were determined
107
to be capital expenditures. However, the salaries in Acer Realty were
"unusual, nonrecurrent services." 108 In the case at hand, the officers had
always received salaries, and they were not increased or altered as a re109
sult of the transaction. In Acer Realty, the company was in the leasing
business, and the officers had not received salaries prior to the particular
110
building transaction for which they were paid. The salaries were directly related to the transaction for services typically performed by a
111
general contractor and not by a leasing business. Thus, the court found
that the salaries in Acer Realty were not ordinary expenditures for the
112
leasing business and must be capitalized.
The Tax Court concluded that INDOPCO required the capitalization
of the officers' salaries. However, a closer analysis of INDOPCO supports the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Wells Fargo. In INDOPCO, the Supreme Court held that in investment banking, legal and other expenses
incurred in a friendly takeover were not ordinary and necessary expenses
but instead must be capitalized. 113 In particular, the Court articulated four
principles as the foundation for requiring the expenditures to be capitalized: (1) the clear reflection of income; (2) the principle that capitalization is the norm; (3) the "separate and distinct" asset test; and (4) the "fu114
ture benefits" test.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining that the issue
was one of clear reflection of income. Referring to sections 162, 263, and
167 of the I.R.C., the Court explained: "Through provisions such as
these, the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the
taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting

105. /d. at 100-0 I.
I 06. /d. at 102.
107. See Acer Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1942).
108. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 887 (quotingAcer Realty, 132 F.2d at 513).
109. See id. at 888.
110. See Acer Realty, 132 F.2d at 514.
Ill. See id.
112. See id.
113. See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 79.
114. See id. at 83-88; see also GINSBURG & LEVIN, supra note 78, at 957-59. The third principle, "separate and distinct" asset test is not applicable here because there was not separate asset.
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in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes." This
statement supports the finding in INDOPCO that the investment banker
fees and legal fees incurred as a direct result of obtaining professional
opinions regarding the takeover would be attributable to future tax periods. However, it is not so clear that expenses like those at issue here (officers' salaries that have always been paid and would have been paid regardless of the merger) would be attributable to future tax periods.
Indeed, it would appear that the opposite was true-that the salaries were
attributable to the current tax period and thus would warrant current deduction. The officers' salaries had always been paid and were not determined or affected by the merger. Had there been no merger talks, the
salaries still would have been paid and would have been currently deductible as an ordinary expense.
In INDOPCO, the Court required investment banking fees and legal
expenses that were a direct result of a friendly merger to be capitalized.
These expenses are markedly different from those in the case at hand.
The expenses in INDOPCO were incurred as a direct consequence of the
merger. Had the merger talks never been undertaken, these costs would
not have been incurred. Consequently, they were directly related to the
merger and thus clearly attributable to any future benefits that the merger
would bring. However, this link cannot be made for the officers' salaries
in the Wells Fargo case at hand.
The second principle outlined in INDOPCO is that capitalization is
the norm. The Supreme Court explained:
The notion that deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization
finds support in various aspects of the Code. Deductions are specifically enumerated and thus are subject to disallowance in favor of capitalization. Nondeductible capital expenditures, by contrast, are not exhaustively enumerated in the Code; rather than providing a 'complete
list of nondeductible expenditures,' ... section 263 serves as a general
116
means of distinguishing capital expenditures from current expenses.

Although at first this may appear to be a powerful blow to the deduction-seeking taxpayer, it is important to note that the Court was not establishing a new rule but merely seeking to explain the established law.
The Court obviously explained that the bar was high, but it did not state
anything new. Even the Commissioner stated that INDOPCO did not
. pnnctp
. . Ies. 111
c hange any govemmg

115. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83-84.
116. !d. at 84.
117. See Rev. Rul. 94-12.
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Finally, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify Lincoln Savings and
explained that "[a]lthough the mere presence of an incidental future
benefit-some future aspect-may not warrant capitalization, a taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year the expenditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate
tax treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization." 118
The Tax Court interpreted this as meaning that any expenditure that
creates a "future benefit" must be capitalized. But as the Eighth Circuit
explained, that is simply not what INDOPCO held. 119 The Supreme
Court did not expressly or exclusively adopt either the "separate and distinct asset" test or the "significant future benefit" test. INDOPCO merely
pronounced a "facts-and-circumstances" standard. 120 The Tax Court
failed to analyze the facts and circumstances and instead jumped to the
conclusion that all the expenditures even indirectly relating to the merger
must be capitalized because a merger would provide a significant future
benefit. 121 The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, correctly analyzed
the separate expenditures and, based on the facts and circumstances, determined that the officers' salaries were deductible.
2. The legislative history of Code section 195 supports the holding in

Wells Fargo
The Eighth Circuit's opinion is consistent with the legislative intent
of section 195. Section 195 allows a taxpayer to amortize any "start-up
expenditures." 122 Section 195(c )(I) defines "start-up expenditures" to
mean any amount
(A) paid or incurred in connection with investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade or business ... and (B) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an existing active trade or
business (in the same field as the trade or business referred to in subparagraph (A)), would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year
. wh'IC h pa1'd or mcurre
.
d.123m

Consequently, when the parties are not in the same business, a portion of the investigatory costs should qualify for elective amortization.
When the parties are in the same business, the expenses should be immediately deductible. However, if Norwest is correct, it would require that
any expenses that produce a significant future benefit be capitalized.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 87.
See Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 889; see supra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
See Javaras & Maynes, supra note 15 §IV at A-25.
See Norwest, 112 T.C. at 89.
I.R.C. § 195 (1994). See generallyJavaras & Maynes, supra note 15.
I.R.C. § 195(c) (1994).
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Thus, no deduction would be allowed if the parties were in the same
business. Similarly, no amortization would be allowed when the parties
were not in the same business because it would not pass the second
prong, i.e. that the expenditure would have been deductible if incurred in
connection with an existing business. 124
In Norwest, the Tax Court held that section 195 was not contrary to
its conclusion. In particular, the court "held that section 195 does not require 'that every expenditure incurred in any business expansion is to be
currently deductible. "' 125 However, what the Tax Court did not consider
was that, although section 195 does not require all business expansion
costs to be deductible, it clearly does not require that all costs be capitalized.
The legislative history to section 195 states: "In the case of an existing business, eligible start-up expenditures do not include deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred in connection
with an expansion of the business. As under present law, these expenses
will continue to be currently deductible." 126 If business expansion costs
are not deductible, then the expenses described in section 195(c )(I )(A)
could never satisfy the requirements in section 195(c )(I )(B), and no expenditure incurred for expanding an existing trade or business would
qualify as a "start-up expenditure," a proposition that is clearly contrary
to the intent of Congress that the expenses described in section
195(c )(I )(A) be eligible for amortization under section 195. 127
The opinion in Norwest was inconsistent with the legislative intent in
section 195, and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the Tax Court.
3. Wells Fargo is consistent with the IRS's prior positions

The Service has stated that the decision of INDOPCO "did not
change the fundamental legal principles for determining whether a particular expenditure may be deducted or must be capitalized." 128 However,
the IRS seems to be arguing a new position with respect to the deductibility of salaries.
The IRS has long held the position that the portion of salaries allocable to an acquisition must be capitalized. But that has only been for
those who spend a "substantial amount of their time on mergers and ac-

124. See GINSBURG & LEVIN supra note 78, at 4-11.
125. Norwest, 112 T.C. at 102 (quoting FMR Corp. & Subs. v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 402, 429
(1998)).
126. S. REP. No. 96-1036, at 12 (1980).
127. See GINSBURG & LEVIN supra note 78, at 4-15 to 4-16.
128. Notice 96-7, 1996-6 I.R.B. 22.
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129

quisitions." In Rev. Rul. 73-580, the IRS stated that "compensation
paid for services performed by ... employees relating to the acquisition
of other corporations ... is not distinguishable from fees paid for similar
services performed by outsiders." 130 The expenses at issue in Rev Rul.
73-580 were payments to employees in the company's legal department,
accounting department, and internal audit staff who spent a substantial
amount of their time on mergers and acquisitions--costs directly related
to and incurred solely as a result of the merger.
However, the Tax Court went well beyond Rev. Rul. 73-580 in requiring capitalization of salaries which were only "incidentally" related
to the acquisition. Moreover, the payments in the case at bar were to officers and were the ordinary and regular salaries that they had always received.
The IRS might argue that Rev. Rul. 73-580 specifically included executives' salaries in its holding. In Rev. Rul. 73-580, the IRS explained
that payments to a corporation's president were required to be capitalized. However, these payments are distinguishable because they were not
in the form of salaries but were essentially a payment in stock "as a
commission for consummating the contract of a reorganization." 131 The
stock paid to the president was entirely dependent and directly related to
the consummation of the transaction. The president's regular salary was
not required to be capitalized. In the Wells Fargo case, the salaries were
not bonuses for undertaking or completing the merger, but instead were
regular salaries that were in no way dependent upon the consummation
of a transaction. These salaries were similar to the president's regular
salary that was not required to be capitalized.
Rev. Rul. 99-23 made clear that investigatory costs incurred in the
general search for a new business are eligible for amortization under section 195. Furthermore, it distinguished costs incurred when expanding an
existing business and concluded that "a taxpayer incurring costs to investigate the expansion of an existing business generally could deduct those
costs under § 162, assuming that other requirements of that section were
met." This is consistent with the legislative history of section 195. 132 The
position of the IRS and the Tax Court that the investigatory costs are not
deductible is inconsistent with section 195, its legislative history, and
Rev. Ruls. 73-580 and 99-23.

129.
130.
131.
132.

Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C. B. 86. See also GINSBURG &
Rev. Rul. 73-580, 1973-2 C.B. 86.
/d.

See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.

LEVIN

supra note 78, at 4-19.
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4. Public policy supports the Wells Fargo decision
A fundamental problem with the Tax Court's ruling that "indirect"
costs of a merger be capitalized is that, if the rationale is carried to its
logical extreme, it would result in the capitalization of any cost that in
any way could be indirectly allocated to a business expansion because
the expansion itself is arbitrarily deemed to have a significant benefit.
This could lead to a requirement that overhead costs that have always
been ordinary and necessary expenses, and that would be incurred regardless of the merger, similar to the officers' salaries, be capitalized to a
certain extent because the costs are somehow indirectly related to the
merger (perhaps there were meetings in the offices, or the officers used
corporate supplies while evaluating the transaction). At some point the
rationale becomes absurd, and capitalizing the officers' salaries in this
case reaches that point. Nearly everything officers do provides a future
benefit. But it would be inequitable for their ordinary salaries to be capitalized.
More disturbing is the fact that if these expenses are required to be
capitalized, not only will they not be currently deducted, but for practical
matters they may never be deducted. The expenditures are not tied to an
asset or something that can be depreciated. Instead, they relate to a transaction that has no defined useful life. Consequently, the expenses cannot
be deducted until the business is disposed of or sold. In essence, the Tax
Court's holding simply evaporated an ordinary and necessary expense.
V. CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit correctly concluded that the investigatory/legal
fees and the officers' salaries were currently deductible. The investigatory and legal fees at issue were incurred prior to the "final decision" and
thus were properly deducted. The officers' salaries were ordinary expenses only indirectly related to the transaction. After an analysis of the
case law, the legislative history of section 195, the IRS's positions, and
public policy, it is reasonable to conclude that the Eighth Circuit properly
allowed the salaries to be currently deducted.

Jeffery R. Atkin

